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41 Introduction
5Within the fields of asylum, migration and criminal law, numerous 
initiatives have been taken over the past decades in order to enhance and 
secure cooperation procedures and to facilitate the mutual recognition of 
judicial and administrative decisions between the Member States of the 
European Union (EU). In the Stockholm programme of 2010, the Council 
of the EU has stated that mutual trust between authorities and services in 
the different Member States and decision-makers is essential for efficient 
cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs.1 Especially in the area 
of judicial cooperation mutual trust should be a cornerstone. According 
to the Council “[T]he Union should continue to enhance mutual trust in 
the legal systems of the Member States by establishing minimum rights 
as necessary for the development of the principle of mutual recognition 
and by establishing minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions as defined by the Treaty”.2 Likewise, the European 
Commission in its recent Communication on migration places much 
importance on mutual trust in the area of migration and border control.3
It is certainly true that these developments in intensified cooperation 
have brought many benefits, including protection of individuals’ rights. 
In the area of criminal law, for instance, several instruments on mutual 
recognition have broadened the possibilities for suspected and convicted 
persons to serve pre-trial conditions as well as final sentences in their 
Member State of residence, which serves the goal of social rehabilitation.4 
Furthermore, not only have steps been taken to create shared norms 
related to the rights of suspected and convicted persons throughout the EU,5 
several rights of the victims of crime have also been harmonized on an EU 
1 Stockholm programme: an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 4.5.2010, C 115/1, 
p.5.
2 Ibid p. 12.
3 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions COM(2011)248 final, 4.5.2011, p. 7.
4 For instance Council Framework Decision 2008/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 on the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an alternative to provisional 
detention, OJ 11.11.2009, L 294/20; Council Framework Decision 2009/808/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments imposing custodial sentences or measures 
involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, OJ 5.12.2008, 
L 327/27.
5 Recently, these attempts have been stimulated by the adoption of a roadmap for strengthening procedural 
rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings, see the Resolution of the Council of 30 No-
vember 2009, OJ 4.12.2009, C 295/1, which has prompted the launch of several directives, such as Directive 
2010/64/EU of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal proceedings, OJ 
26.10.2010, L 280/1.
6level.6 In the field of migration law, the application of mutual recognition 
may have positive consequences for the legal status of the migrant. For 
example, a person who has been issued with a so-called Schengen visa by 
one Member State has the freedom to travel within the territory of all 
Member States that are part of the Schengen area. Other examples are 
the mutual recognition of long-term resident status (Directive 2003/109) 
and labour migrant status (Blue Card Directive 2009/50) and, in asylum 
law, recognition by other Member States of refugee status and subsidiary 
protection status granted in accordance with the Qualification Directive 
2004/83, pursuant to the amended long-term residents directive (Directive 
2011/51).
However, at the same time, protection of individual rights is, in practice, 
likely to be threatened, particularly as a result of the assumption of 
mutual trust. After all, in the EU, initiatives aimed at closer cooperation 
in the fields of asylum, migration, and criminal law, are all built on 
the same premise, which is a high level of mutual trust between the 
respective Member States. On the basis of this high level of trust, the 
freedom for Member States to refuse a request issued by another Member 
State is limited: for example, even where there is severe doubt that the 
fundamental rights of the individuals concerned will be protected, Member 
States may be obliged to extradite suspects or to expel asylum seekers. 
The Meijers Committee feels that it is time to launch a fundamental 
reflection on the notion of mutual trust in relation to the protection of 
fundamental rights. Even though it seems obvious that a certain level of 
trust is a condition sine qua non for effective cooperation between different 
parties, it still remains unclear what exactly is mutual trust. In attempting 
to answer this question, it is necessary to distinguish between formal trust 
and trust in concreto (or substantive trust). Whereas a formal interpretation 
derives trust from fixed facts and figures – such as the fact that the foreign 
state in question is bound by a certain treaty or agreement – substantive 
trust is determined by the particular circumstances of an individual case.7 
6 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal 
proceedings, OJ 22.3.2001, L 82/1. A follow-up is currently being discussed: Proposal for a Resolution of the 
Council on a Roadmap for strengthening the rights and protection of victims, in particular in criminal 
proceedings, Council Document No. 104/88/11 of 25 May 2011 (most recent text). See further the proposal 
for a directive on the European Protection Order, OJ 18.3.2010, C 69/5.
7 See N. Rozemond, Begrensd vertrouwen. Mensenrechtenbescherming bij uitlevering en overlevering (preadvies voor 
de vergadering van de Christen Juristen Vereniging op 15 mei 2009), Zutphen: Paris 2009 (see also http://
www.christenjuristen.org/content/preadvies), p. 43.
7The question of whether in the context of the EU trust tends to be formal 
or is assessed in concreto is of fundamental importance, as it relates to 
the margins of judicial review; formal trust implies an assessment ex ante 
– (that is to say, before the adoption of a certain instrument on mutual 
recognition), while substantive trust needs to be determined ex post (namely 
after the adoption of a mutual recognition instrument, thereby allowing 
the judicial authorities to assess the level of trust as soon as a request for 
recognition has been issued).8 
Below, we will analyse how mutual trust functions in four areas of EU 
law: the allocation of asylum seekers (or the Dublin system, chapter 2), the 
registration and exchange of data on inadmissible third-country nationals 
(SIS, chapter 3), the expulsion of illegally present third-country nationals 
(the Returns Directive, chapter 4) and, finally, criminal law and extradition 
( chapter 5). In each of these fields, it will be established how mutual trust 
is being justified in European law, and in which kinds of cases exceptions 
to blind trust are allowed. For all these areas we discuss when the 
presumption should be open to rebuttal and which procedural safeguards 
are required for doing so effectively. Based on this analysis, chapter 6 
presents a number of recommendations.
8 J.W. Ouwerkerk, ‘Wederzijdse erkenning en wederzijds vertrouwen: de Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake 
overlevering’, in: R.S.T. Gaarthuis, T. Kooijmans en Th. A. de Roos, Vertrouwen in de strafrechtspleging, Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2010, pp. 91.
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92.1    Introduction
The Dublin system allocates responsibility for asylum seekers.9 It is based 
on mutual trust, i.e. on the assumption that each Member State10 will treat 
asylum seekers and examine their claims in accordance with the relevant 
rules of national, European, and international law. 
The Dublin system was designed in the 1980s.11 As internal border 
controls were abolished, asylum seekers would be able to move more easily 
within the Schengen area and lodge claims with several Member States. 
The system was set up in order to ensure that only one state would be 
responsible for examining the claim for asylum. If the applicant turned up 
in another Member State, he or she would be sent back to the responsible 
state; the other, non-responsible state would not have to examine his or her 
claim for asylum.12 
Pursuant to the Dublin Regulation, responsibility for a particular 
asylum seeker is allocated on the basis of certain “criteria”. These criteria 
bestow responsibility on the state where either some family member is 
already present, or where the state actively or passively facilitated the entry 
of the third-country national – the state that issued a visa – or where the 
third-country national (TCN) entered illegally. If none of these criteria 
applies, the state where the asylum seeker first lodged his or her request 
for asylum is responsible. Regardless of these criteria, a Member State may 
further incur responsibility by failing to meet a time limit stated in the 
Regulation.13 
Responsibility entails the obligation to take charge of (or to take back) 
the (failed) asylum seeker who turns up in a non-responsible state and, 
most relevant for present purposes, to “examine” the claim for asylum.14 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Mem-
ber States by a third-country national, OJ L 50 [2003], p. 1-10. The rules making up the Dublin system were 
first laid down in the Dublin Convention (Convention determining the State responsible for examining 
applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the European Communities, OJ C 254 [1997], 
p. 1), and subsequently in the Dublin II Regulation; a proposal for recasting the Regulation is currently 
being examined by the Council (COM(2008) 820). In all these instruments, the basic tenets are the same.
10 The Dublin II Regulation applies in all Member States, except for Denmark (Preamble recital (18). Pursuant 
to agreements between the European Union and Denmark (2006/188/EC), Norway (2006/167/EC), Switzer-
land (2008/146/EC) and Liechtenstein (COM(2006) 753), the same rules apply for allocating responsibility 
between the Member States and the latter ones. Below, the term “Member state”  is used to cover the latter 
states as well, except where otherwise indicated.  
11 See G. Noll,  Negotiating asylum, Leiden/Boston: Nijhoff 2000, pp. 119-128.
12 See Articles 3(1) and 16 DR. 
13 The regulation states time limits for Dublin states for requesting to accept responsibility, for answering to 
such a request and for carrying out the transfer of the asylum seeker. See Article 17 DR. 
14 Article 16 DR.
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Mutual trust in the context of the Dublin system, hence, concerns the 
examination of the request for asylum by the other Member State, i.e. the 
procedure for sorting out whether or not the third-country national fulfils 
the requirements for international protection. Further, it concerns the 
treatment of the asylum seeker during this examination. 
2.2    Justifications for mutual trust
The Dublin Regulation explicitly states that mutual trust is justified: all 
Member States, “respecting the principle of non-refoulement, are considered 
as safe countries for third country nationals”.15 It refers in this context to 
the Refugee Convention, to which all Member States are parties and to the 
Common European Asylum System. When the Council adopted the Dublin II 
Regulation, the latter did not yet exist but now (2011) this System covers a 
number of directives that have since been adopted. It concerns the Asylum 
Procedures Directive that provides for rules on procedure and gives some 
guarantees, e.g. the right to have a hearing and to not be expelled before 
a decision at first instance has been taken.16 The Qualification Directive 
provides for rules on the interpretation of the Refugee Convention and 
on the issue of protection on other (subsidiary) grounds.17 It requires 
recognition of those fulfilling the conditions for refugee or subsidiary 
protection status, and stipulates the secondary rights to which refugees and 
subsidiary protection beneficiaries are entitled. As regards treatment of 
asylum seekers, the Reception Conditions Directive provides for a number of 
rules on the treatment of asylum seekers whose asylum requests are being 
processed, e.g., housing, food et cetera.18 The Receptions Conditions Directive 
and the Asylum Procedures Directive further provide for some (quite basic) 
guarantees on detention.19 
Another basis for mutual trust can be found in the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). All Member States are parties to this instrument 
and are assumed to comply with their obligations under it.20 The ECHR 
15 Preamble recital (2) DR
16 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States 
for granting and withdrawing refugee status,  OJ L 326 [2005], p. 13–34.
17 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 304 [2004], p. 12-23.
18 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers, OJ L 31 [2003], p.18-25.
19 Article 13 RCD and Article 18 APD. 
20 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 150.
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states obligations with respect to expulsion to the country of origin and 
treatment of asylum seekers (Article 3 ECHR) and on asylum procedures 
(Article 13).21 Most relevant in the asylum context, the European Convention 
system provides for institutional guarantees: in each Dublin state, asylum 
seekers can lodge complaints with the Strasbourg Court, claiming that 
expulsion to the country of origin would violate Article 3 ECHR. Moreover, 
they have the possibility to request an interim measure to preclude 
expulsion before the Court examines their case.22 
In sum, formal trust is warranted on the basis of legal instruments 
binding the receiving state. All Dublin states are parties to both the 
Refugee Convention and the ECHR, and they are obliged to comply with 
directives addressing aspects of the treatment of asylum seekers and 
asylum procedures. Further, trust is warranted because, under the ECHR, 
the applicant can complain about ill-treatment or expulsion likely to be in 
violation of Articles 3 and 13 ECHR after transfer to the receiving state. 
2.3 Exceptions to mutual trust
The Dublin Regulation assumes that all Member States are safe (at least 
for the purposes of the Refugee Convention), but it does not require Dublin 
states to assume safety in every case. Thus, the Dublin system never 
obliges Dublin states to expel asylum seekers to each other. A Member 
State may voluntarily assume responsibility for an asylum seeker, even 
though another state would be responsible on the basis of the criteria or 
for failing to meet a time limit. The so-called  “humanitarian clause” in 
the Dublin Regulation urges Member States to assume responsibility to 
reunite minors with family members or dependent family members with 
each other.23 The “sovereignty clause”, Article 3(2), allows Member States to 
assume responsibility on every ground for a TCN who has lodged an asylum 
claim with it. If a Member State applies Article 3(2), it must inform the 
Member State that was previously responsible, and incurs all that Member 
State’s obligations: it must examine the claim for asylum and take back the 
applicant if he or she travels to another state. 
21 Idem, para. 218-222, 288-293.
22 ECtHR 2 December 2008, K.R.S. v UK, appl. no. 32733/08; ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
(GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 286-288.
23 Article 15 DR.
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The Dublin Regulation does not state when a Dublin state must assume 
responsibility making use of Article 3(2). Member States can apply Article 
3(2) on national grounds, such as for humanitarian reasons.24 Most 
relevant for present purposes, the provision allows them to abide by their 
international obligations. 
2.4 Relativity of mutual trust
In the context of the Dublin system, mutual trust cannot be absolute. The 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated this in 2000 in the case of 
T.I. v UK,25 and recently it reiterated in M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece:
“When they apply the Dublin Regulation […] the States must make sure 
that the intermediary country’s asylum procedure affords sufficient 
guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker being removed, directly or 
indirectly, to his country of origin without any evaluation of the risks 
he faces from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention”.26
Why can the above-mentioned guarantees not warrant blind trust? 
Interpretation and application of international law still varies widely 
among the Member States. This was precisely the reason why the European 
Union embarked on creating the Common European Asylum System. 
However, asylum procedures, reception conditions and the qualification of 
persons in need of protection are only harmonized in Directives to a limited 
degree. For example, the rules on asylum procedures do not address certain 
key aspects of the procedure, such as the scope and intensity of judicial 
scrutiny or the suspensive effect of appeal. The standard set by key notions 
such as “well-founded fear” or “real risk” is only very partially addressed.27 
Moreover, the Directives provide for guarantees only in so far as the states 
participating in the Dublin system are bound by them.28 
But even where the same rules are applied, the results may and do vary 
from state to state. Most conspicuously, the Member States decide asylum 
24 E.g. for the Netherlands see Aliens Circular C2/2.3.6.4.
25 ECtHR (dec.) 7 March 2000, T.I. v. UK,  appl. no. 43844/98.
26 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 342. 
27 It may be noted that the proposals for amendment submitted by the Commission in 2008 do not fill this 
gap.
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national, OJ L 50 [2003], p. 1-10.  
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claims on the basis of their own country of origin information in which 
the circumstances might be assessed quite differently. As a result, the 
recognition rates of categories of asylum seekers still show considerable 
differences some years after the Directives have been implemented. 
Recognition rates have ranged from close to 0% (Slovakia, Greece) to almost 
50% (Sweden); similar differences have also been found with regard to 
asylum seekers from the same country of origin.29
Equally importantly, the existence of international and Union law does 
not guarantee that that law is being applied, as the case of M.S.S. v Belgium 
and Greece made abundantly clear. It turned out that Greece systematically 
did not offer reception, that it did not process many asylum claims and 
that if it did, it did not properly examine many applications. In such 
circumstances, even the safety net of the Convention protection system (i.e. 
the possibility to appeal to the Strasbourg Court and request the imposition 
of an interim measure) did not provide adequate protection.30 
Finally, we may note that the Strasbourg protection system cannot 
warrant trust as regards any state (i.e. including those states where the 
applicant can lodge a complaint with the European Court and that do 
comply with interim measures) if the applicant submits that he or she 
will be treated contrary to Article 3 ECHR in the receiving state. The 
prohibition of refoulement serves to preclude exposure to ill-treatment, 
hence examination of the situation in the receiving state before transfer. 
Therefore, states cannot rely on the applicant’s right to lodge a complaint 
with the Court after the ill-treatment occurred: it would simply be too late. 
In sum, under the current European Asylum System trust between Member 
States is justified to a certain extent, and Member States may assume that 
the responsible state is safe for the purposes of international asylum law. 
However, this assumption is not absolute and Article 3 ECHR (as well as 
other prohibitions on refoulement) requires that the asylum seeker should 
have the opportunity to challenge the assumption in the asylum procedure 
in the second Member State. Hence, international law requires that asylum 
seekers should have an opportunity to try and rebut the presumption of 
safety of the receiving Member State. Questions have now been referred 
to the European Court of Justice on whether Union law also allows for or 
29 Commission staff working document accompanying the communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
Regions - Policy plan on asylum : an integrated approach to protection across the EU - Impact Assessment, 
SEC(2008) 2029, p. 14.
30 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 357. 
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requires examination by the second state when the first state does not offer 
proper reception or sufficient procedural guarantees and does not correctly 
examine applications.31 References for preliminary rulings have been made 
on the questions: (1) whether European law can require Member States 
to make use of Article 3(2), and if so (2) what implications the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights and the directives on Asylum Procedures, Reception 
Conditions and Qualification may have for this obligation.  
2.5 Procedural safeguards 
The Dublin Regulation provides for some procedural safeguards for the 
applicant as regards the decision to transfer; most importantly, it states 
that this decision must state reasons.32 It does not require that the applicant 
can state his or her views on the intended transfer. Whether this possibility 
exists in practice, hence, depends on the implementation of these 
procedural requirements. In the Netherlands, for instance, the asylum 
seeker has the opportunity to state his or her view on the intention to 
transfer him or her to the responsible state.33 In Belgium on the other hand, 
as it appeared from M.S.S., the applicant had no such opportunity before the 
decision was taken and could bring forward his grounds for rebutting the 
presumption of trust only in the appeal proceedings – which were of such a 
summary nature that they rendered this opportunity illusory.34 
On appeal, the Dublin Regulation says that the decision to transfer the 
applicant to another Dublin state “may” be subject to appeal or review, 
and that this appeal “shall not suspend the implementation of the transfer 
unless the courts or competent bodies so decide on a case by case basis if 
national legislation allows for this”.35 Hence, the Dublin Regulation only 
allows for but does not secure that the applicant has access to judicial 
review with suspensive effect, as required by Article 13 ECHR. 
The Asylum Procedures Directive also contains safeguards, but according 
to its preamble, this Directive “does not deal with procedures governed 
by” the Dublin Regulation. Presumably, this statement is intended to 
31 See joined cases C-411/10 (NS v SSHD), 493/10 (M.E. and others v Refugee Applications Commissioner), and 
4/11 (Federal Republic of Germany v Kaveh Puid).
32 Article 19(2) and 20(1) DR.
33 Pursuant to Article 39 Aliens Act 2000, the minister for Asylum and Immigration must inform the ap-
plicant for asylum of his “ intent” (“voornemen”) to reject the claim for asylum, stating his reasons; the 
applicant can bring forward his “ view”  on this intent and hence challenge those reasons. 
34 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 351.
35 Article 19(2) and 20(1) DR.
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exclude from the scope of the Asylum Procedures Directive the procedure 
to challenge the decision to transfer to the responsible state. Although the 
scope of the Asylum Procedures Directive may also be construed differently, 
it is safe to conclude that the applicability of the safeguards in the Directive 
to the Dublin procedure is far from certain. Accordingly, the Asylum 
Procedures Directive does not offer firm additional guarantees. 
We may conclude that the procedural arrangements prescribed in the 
Dublin Regulation do not meet relevant standards as they do not ensure 
that the applicant has the possibility to put forward grounds for rebutting 
the presumption of safety before the decision to transfer has been taken, 
nor does it ensure that he or she can challenge such a decision before a 
court. 
2.6 Rebuttal of mutual trust
For the purposes of asylum law, trust in the receiving Member State 
concerns two issues. First, the trust that the receiving Member State 
will not ill-treat the asylum seeker by detaining him or her in degrading 
circumstances or expose him or her to living standards in violation of 
Article 3 ECHR. In other words, Member States should be able to assume 
that Dublin expulsion will not amount to direct refoulement.36 Second, 
the return should not amount to indirect refoulement, i.e. not amount to 
a real risk that the receiving Member State will expel the asylum seeker 
to his or her country of origin without proper examination of the claim 
for protection under Article 3 ECHR, Article 33 Geneva Convention or any 
other prohibition on refoulement.37 This means that the transferring state 
should make sure that the receiving state offers appropriate procedural 
guarantees. 
a)	Grounds	for	rebuttal
As noted above, the starting point is trust in the receiving Member State.38 
On what grounds should a Member State regard the presumption of trust 
as rebutted – put otherwise, what is the burden of proof for rebutting the 
presumption that the receiving Member State is safe? It appears that we 
may distinguish between two types of situations. First, where there are 
36 E.g. Idem, para. 365. 
37 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 342, quoted above.
38 Idem, para. 343.
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no reports or other sources indicating that the procedure or reception in 
the receiving state suffers serious shortcomings. In such a case, it must 
be shown that the particular asylum seeker runs a risk of ill-treatment 
in chain-refoulement by the receiving state because of particular 
circumstances.39 Thus, it must be shown that “special distinguishing 
features” apply. The second situation applies if numerous “reliable sources 
have reported practices resorted to or tolerated by the authorities which 
are manifestly contrary to the principles of the Convention”40 which 
may be sufficient to show that the risk is real.41 Obviously, there may be 
intermediate cases: reports giving alarming signals as to certain aspects of 
asylum practice in a state, but no reassuring details on other aspects. 
b)	The	burden	of	proof
Who bears the burden of proving that due to either individual 
circumstances or general reports the receiving state can no longer be 
regarded as safe? Arguably, the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights is somewhat equivocal in this respect. On the one hand it says in 
M.S.S. that the applicant should not bear the “entire” burden,42 suggesting 
that he or she does so to a limited extent. On the other hand it states that 
because reliable sources have reported systematic gross shortcomings in the 
asylum procedure in the receiving Member State, a more active role by the 
second state is required: “[I]t was in fact up to the Belgian authorities … not 
merely to assume that the applicant would be treated in conformity with 
the Convention standards but, on the contrary, to first verify how the Greek 
authorities applied their legislation on asylum in practice.”43 Arguably, 
the latter finding may be bound up with the peculiarities of the domestic 
procedure under review that did not offer any opportunity to the applicant 
to bring forward grounds for rebuttal. Opting for the first, cautious 
approach and hence assuming that the burden of proof may partially lie 
with the applicant, the implications of the judgment would be as follows. 
As in all asylum cases, the burden of proof will, in principle, initially lie 
with the applicant who should “adduce evidence capable of proving that” 
he or she runs a real risk of ill-treatment; if he or she does so, “it is for the 
39 See ECtHR 7 March 2000, T.I. v UK, appl. no. 43844/98.
40 ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 353.
41 Idem, para. 359; the Court further elucidates that “The fact that a large number of asylum seekers in 
Greece find themselves in the same situation as the applicant does not make the risk concerned any less 
individual where it is sufficiently real and probable”. 
42 Idem, para. 352. 
43 Idem, para. 359.
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Government to dispel any doubts about it”.44 This main rule will apply if 
the domestic procedure allows the applicant to bring forward grounds for 
rebuttal. If it does not concern individual grounds for rebuttal connected 
to personal circumstances, but the general situation in the state, it appears 
from M.S.S. that the transferring state has a considerable obligation to 
investigate the situation after transfer. If domestic procedures do not offer 
the applicant the opportunity to rebut the presumption of safety, the entire 
burden of proof rests with the Member State. 
c)	The	standard	of	proof
When exactly can trust be considered to have been rebutted?  In this 
respect the case law is somewhat equivocal. In K.R.S. v UK, the Court implied 
that attested cases of refoulement were required. In M.S.S. it referred to 
“practical difficulties involved in the application of the Dublin system in 
Greece, the deficiencies of the asylum procedure and the practice of direct 
or indirect refoulement on an individual or a collective basis”,45 which 
implies that refoulement cases are relevant but not necessary for rebutting 
the presumption. Furthermore, with regard to the argument that applicants 
should complain in the receiving state about breaches of the Convention the 
Court said that:  
“While considering that this is in principle the most normal course of 
action under the Convention system, the Court deems that its analysis 
of the obstacles facing asylum seekers in Greece clearly shows that 
applications lodged there at this point in time are illusory.”46 
This suggests that unless there are indications that the applicant will not 
be able to complain to the Court or that the receiving state will not comply 
with an interim measure, the Strasbourg protection system warrants 
mutual trust even if the domestic system has been found to be deficient on 
the basis of general reports. As submitted above (para. 2.4), this trust can 
only concern the examination of the application for asylum in the receiving 
state, but not the treatment, as required by Article 3 ECHR, received there. 
44 ECtHR 28 February 2008, Saadi v Italy (GC), appl. no. 37201/06, para. 129. 
45 ECtHR 21 January 2011,  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09, para. 347.
46 Idem, para. 357.
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d)	Personal	scope
Finally, should the safety of the receiving Member State be assessed for 
every asylum seeker who will be returned under the Dublin Regulation? 
The Strasbourg case law suggests that as far as a risk of indirect refoulement 
is stated, the issue does not have to be addressed if the applicant has no 
“arguable claim” of ill-treatment if returned to the country of origin. 
Obviously, such a threshold cannot apply if the asylum practice shows 
general shortcomings. And, equally obviously, such a threshold cannot 
apply as far as a risk of direct refoulement (i.e. a risk of being ill-treated in 
the receiving Member State) is stated.
e)	Procedural	requirements	for	rebutting
All these requirements presuppose a domestic procedural framework 
enabling the applicant to bring forward grounds for rebutting the 
presumption of trust. In M.S.S., the Court made clear that the usual 
requirements of Article 13 ECHR on appeal proceedings also applied to 
Dublin decisions. In particular, it stated that limiting the examination to 
“verifying whether the persons concerned had produced concrete proof of 
the irreparable nature of the damage that might result from the alleged 
potential violation of Article 3, thereby increasing the burden of proof to 
such an extent as to hinder the examination on the merits of the alleged 
risk of a violation”47 was at variance with Article 13. Furthermore, it made 
clear that obstacles to the applicant bringing forward grounds to rebut the 
presumption of safety during decision making at first instance added to the 
burden of proof on the state. Obviously, the procedural safeguards provided 
for by the Dublin regulation are far from sufficient in these respects.
47  ECtHR 21 January 2011, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), appl. no. 30696/09,  para. 389. 
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3.1 Introduction 
In the field of EU migration law, mutual trust is most prominently present 
in the exchange of information on registered unwanted aliens. With the 
abolishment of internal border controls by the introduction of the Schengen 
acquis, the need arose for compensatory measures. Since 1995, on the basis 
of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 1990 (CISA), 
‘inadmissible aliens’ are registered in the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). After registration in the SIS, the third-country national concerned 
will be refused entry (or visa) by all Member States (and non-Member 
States: Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) that are bound by the Schengen 
acquis. Furthermore, the Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) provides for 
common standards and procedures regarding the return of illegally staying 
third-country nationals on EU territory. Third-country nationals staying 
illegally on the territory of the Member States will be issued a return 
decision, often accompanied by an entry ban for a certain period. The third-
country national to whom an entry ban has been issued will subsequently 
be registered in the SIS.48 In all these cases, the use of the SIS is based on 
mutual trust in the legislation and practices preceding the entry ban and 
the SIS alert by other Member States. In this chapter, the SIS-system of 
issuing an alert for the refusal of entry is dealt with. Chapter 4 describes 
a connected issue, the system for the issuing of a European entry ban in 
accordance with the Returns Directive.
The Schengen Information System (SIS) serves the exchange of information 
on national alerts on so-called ‘inadmissible aliens’.49 By reporting a third-
country national in the SIS as inadmissible, a Schengen state ensures that 
this person will be refused entry (or visa) by all the other Schengen states 
as well, preventing his or her arrival in the reporting state via the territory 
of other states. Mutual recognition or the mutual enforcement of SIS alerts 
is, in principle, obligatory. Visa authorities and border guards are obliged 
to consult the SIS and a short-term visa or entrance to the territory should 
be refused to a person when he or she is reported for the purpose of refusal 
of entry in the SIS.50 The criteria for entering third-country nationals in 
the SIS for the purpose of refusal are left to the discretion of the Schengen 
48 Recital 18 of the Preamble of Directive 2008/115/EC.
49 According to the SIS database statistics 1/1/2011, 3% of the persons recorded in the SIS concern extradition 
warrants, 78% unwanted aliens. Council doc. 6434/1/1, 4 March 2011.
50 See Article 5 (1) of the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 562/2006) and Article 19 (4) and 21 of the Com-
munity Visa Code (Regulation 810/2019).
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states. Article 96 CISA, the current legal basis of the SIS, and Article 24 
of Regulation 1987/2006 concerning SIS II, successor of the SIS, only refer 
to two categories of reasons for which third-country nationals may be 
reported: if the person is considered a threat to public policy or public 
security or to national security, or for the implementation of immigration 
law decisions. According to Article 96 (2) a situation in the first category 
may arise if a third-country national has been convicted of an offence by a 
Member State, carrying a penalty involving imprisonment for at least one 
year, or if there are serious grounds for believing that the third-country 
national has committed a serious criminal offence or if there are clear 
indications of an intention to commit such offences on the territory of a 
contracting party. These criteria are not exhaustive. Hence Member States 
can add other criteria to report third-country nationals for the purpose 
of refusal of entry. The second category includes measures involving 
expulsion, refusal of entry, or removal based on a failure to comply with 
national regulations concerning the entry or residence of third-country 
nationals, including or accompanied by a ban on entry or, where applicable, 
a ban on residence.
3.2 Justifications for mutual trust
Neither the CISA nor Regulation 1987/2006 concerning the SIS II refers 
explicitly to the principle of mutual recognition or trust. The justification of 
the mutual recognition of national alerts is implied in the primary goal of 
the SIS and SIS II: the exchange of national information to safeguard public 
policy and public security and the application of national immigration 
rules, compensating for the abolition of internal border controls.51 The 
aforementioned use of the SIS implies that the contracting parties have 
agreed to mutually enforce their public order or security measures and 
national immigration law decisions, without harmonizing the national 
criteria within this field of law.
As a long-term measure, the Schengen Agreement of 1985, in Articles 
17 and 20, did envisage the harmonization of visa laws and the provisions 
concerning the prohibitions and restrictions on which the checks on third-
country nationals are based. Preamble 10 of Regulation 1987/2006 explicitly 
51 See Article 93 CISA and preamble 5 of the SIS II Regulation 1987/2006: “constitute a compensatory measure 
contributing to maintaining a high level of security within the area of freedom, security and justice of the 
European Union by supporting the implementation of policies linked to the movement of persons that are 
part of the Schengen acquis, as integrated into Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty.”
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refers to the necessity “to further consider harmonising the provisions on 
the grounds for issuing alerts concerning third-country nationals for the 
purpose of refusing entry”. Article 24 (5) Regulation 1987/2006 even includes 
a sunset clause, requiring the Commission to evaluate the application of the 
criteria to report third-country nationals in the SIS II, three years after the 
date of its application. This review should be the basis for the Commission 
to: “make the necessary proposals to modify the provisions of this Article to 
achieve a greater level of harmonisation of the criteria for entering alerts”. 
Even if in the long term the EU legislator considers closer harmonization 
a prerequisite to justify mutual recognition of SIS alerts, in practice the 
current use of the SIS is still based on the discretionary power of the 
Schengen states. Since 1995, the year the SIS became operational, no serious 
proposals have been submitted for further harmonization of the national 
criteria for a SIS alert for the purpose of refusing entry. 
Article 21 of SIS II Regulation obliges states issuing an alert in the SIS, to 
determine whether the case is “adequate, relevant, and important enough” 
to warrant entry in the SIS. Furthermore, they have to assess every three 
years the necessity of further recording in the SIS. These rules imply a 
primary responsibility of the reporting state for assessing not only the 
lawfulness of the alert, but also the justification for its mutual recognition 
or enforcement by other Schengen states. 
3.3 Exceptions to mutual trust
The CISA and the SIS II Regulation do not include an explicit exception 
ground to the mutual recognition of SIS alerts. Article 25 CISA only 
provides that if a Member State considers issuing a residence permit to 
a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purpose of refusal 
of entry, this Member State should first consult the issuing state. The 
residence permit, however, may only be granted for ‘substantive reasons’ 
including humanitarian grounds or reasons based on international 
commitments. If the residence permit is issued, the issuing state should 
withdraw the alert from the SIS. This obligation, to withdraw a SIS alert, 
has not been included in the SIS II Regulation 1987/2006. Article 25 (2) of 
the SIS II Regulation only provides a special procedure with regard to the 
beneficiaries of the right to free movement within the EU. According to this 
procedure, whenever there is a hit concerning a third-country national 
who is a beneficiary of the right of free movement within the Union 
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within the meaning of Directive 2004/38, the executing Member State 
should immediately consult the issuing state. To consult the issuing state, 
the executing Member State should use its SIRENE Bureau: the national 
offices which have been established for the exchange of supplementary 
information on SIS alerts. Article 8 (3) of Regulation 1987/2006 requires 
Member States to answer requests for supplementary information made 
by a Member State with regard to any third-country national “as soon as 
possible”.
More explicit exception grounds to the mutual enforcement of alerts 
on third-country nationals are included in the Community Visa Code 
(Regulation 810/2009) and the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation 
562/2006). Article 25 of the Community Visa Code allows Member States 
to issue a visa with limited territorial validity, despite the SIS alert, 
on humanitarian grounds, for national reasons or to comply with 
international obligations. On the basis of Article 13 (1) of the Schengen 
Borders Code, derogation from the entry conditions (including not 
being registered in the SIS) is possible on the basis of special provisions 
concerning the right to asylum law or the right to international protection, 
or the issue of a long-stay visa. 
3.4 Relativity of mutual trust 
There are two reasons opposing automatic application of mutual trust, 
or in other words, the automatic enforcement of a SIS alert by a second 
Member State. Firstly, Member States are obliged to respect the rights of 
third-country nationals as protected by EU law and international treaties. 
These rights include, amongst others, the free movement rights of family 
members of EU citizens, the right to family life as protected by Article 8 
ECHR and Article 7 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights, and the rights 
of third-country nationals as included in EU immigration and asylum 
instruments and third-country agreements. These rights may result in 
situations in which derogation from mutual recognition of SIS alerts is 
obligatory. This was illustrated in the case Commission v. Spain in which the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) found that Spain had failed 
to observe its obligations with regard to the freedom of movement of EU 
citizens and their family members in the EU.52 In this case, the Spanish 
52  Case C-503/03, Commission v. Spain, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 31 January 2006.
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authorities refused a visa and entry into the territory to two third-country 
nationals, spouses of Spanish citizens, who had been reported in the SIS 
by German authorities for the purpose of refusal of entry. According to 
the Court of Justice, since they had failed to verify first whether these 
third-country nationals constituted a ‘genuine, present and sufficiently 
serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society’, the 
Spanish authorities had acted in breach of Directive 64/221 (now replaced by 
Directive 2004/38). 
When consulting the SIS, immigration officials should also take into 
account the status of long- term resident third-country nationals or family 
members of third-country nationals. Article 6 of Directive 2003/109 on 
long-term resident third-country nationals provides that when Member 
States refuse to grant long-term resident status on grounds of public policy 
or public security, they must consider the severity or type of offence 
against public policy or public security, or the danger that emanates from 
the person concerned. 53 They must also take into account the duration of 
residence and the existence of links with the country of residence. Article 
12 obliges Member States to have regard to the following factors before 
taking the decision to expel a long-term resident:
• the duration of residence in their territory;
• the age of the person concerned;
• the consequences for the person concerned and family members;
• links with the country of residence or the absence of links with the 
country of origin.
The Family Reunification Directive (2003/86) obliges Member States to 
take into account specific circumstances before rejecting, withdrawing or 
refusing to renew a residence permit or deciding to expel the third-country 
national (“sponsor”) or his or her family members.54 These circumstances, 
provided in Article 17 of the directive, include “the nature and solidity of 
the person’s family relationships and the duration of his residence in the 
Member State and of the existence of family, cultural and social ties with 
his/her country of origin”. 
This complexity in law, where different public policy and security 
grounds apply to different categories of third-country nationals, obliges 
Member States to refrain from ‘automatic mutual recognition’ of SIS alerts. 
53 OJ L 16, 23.01.2004. 
54  J L 251, 3.10.2003. This includes long-term residents and refugees.
25
They have to verify the applicability of the aforementioned (or other) 
instruments and whether the relevant conditions are met. 
A second reason to refrain from the automatic application of mutual 
recognition is the principle of proportionality. A minor offence or the 
violation of a relatively unimportant rule of immigration law, resulting 
in a ban on entry or residence to the entire Schengen territory is difficult 
to reconcile with the principle of proportionality which forms the basis 
of the implementation of EU law, including migration law.55 As we have 
seen above, Article 21 of the SIS II Regulation obliges national authorities 
to assess not only the importance of an individual case, but also its 
adequacy and relevance before issuing a SIS alert.56 Although their practical 
implementation is left to the scrutiny of the issuing state, there remains 
an important duty for the executing state to assess the proportionality of a 
refusal of entry or residence on the basis of a SIS alert, in accordance with 
the EU principle of proportionality. 
3.5 Procedural safeguards
Article 111 CISA and Article 43 of the SIS II Regulation each provides the 
right to an individual to bring before the competent court or authority 
in the territory of each contracting party, an action to correct, delete or 
obtain information in connection with an alert involving him or her.57 
Thus, the individual may choose to rebut the correctness, retention, or 
use of a SIS alert not only in the issuing or in the executing state, but 
also in another Schengen state. The aforementioned provisions also 
oblige the national authorities to mutually enforce the decisions of the 
aforementioned courts or competent authorities. Thus, theoretically, 
mutual recognition of SIS alerts is complemented with mutual recognition 
of the final decision-making in the individual procedures remedying the 
lawfulness or accuracy of these alerts. However, research and reports by 
the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority (JSA) have shown that national 
55 See judgments of the ECJ in C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, para. 87 and C-135/08, Rott-
mann v. Freistaat Bayern, 2 March 2010, para. 55, 58.
56 See Article 94 CISA and Articles 21 and 24 of the Regulation 1987/2006 on SIS II.
57 Article 43 reads: 
1.  Any person may bring an action before the courts or the authority competent under the law of any Member State to 
access, correct, delete or obtain information or to obtain compensation in connection with an alert relating to him.
2. The Member States undertake mutually to enforce final decisions handed down by the courts or authorities referred 
to in paragraph 1, without prejudice to the provisions of Article 48.
3.  The rules on remedies provided for in this Article shall be evaluated by the Commission by 17 January 2009.
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authorities are reluctant to enforce the decisions of foreign courts or data 
protection authorities requiring the deletion or correction of a SIS alert.58 
Furthermore, the rules on national procedures are left to the discretion of 
the Member States. Therefore, there are no harmonized rules safeguarding 
the accessibility and effectiveness of the remedies, including, for example, 
procedural guarantees, time limits, and specific powers of the national 
court or competent authority concerned. 
3.6 Rebuttal of mutual trust
In practice, the aforementioned criteria for registering third-country 
nationals in the SIS have been implemented very differently by the 
Schengen states, some states allowing the automatic reporting of a third-
country national if one of the national criteria of refusal of entry has been 
met without an individual assessment of the case, other states applying 
a very low threshold to report third-country nationals in the SIS.59 On 
the basis of the aforementioned criteria, third-country nationals may 
be reported for minor offences and the definitions of “serious criminal 
offences”, “serious grounds” and “clear evidence” leave the Member States 
a wide margin of interpretation and allow them to extend the categories 
of serious offences every time this is considered necessary or desirable. 
Based on the second criterion, third-country nationals may be expelled 
and subsequently registered in the SIS if they have violated a relatively 
unimportant rule of immigration law. For example, according to Dutch law, 
if a person applies too late (by even a day or a week) for the renewal of his 
or her residence permit, or uses false or falsified identity or travel papers 
(which may be for reasons beyond his or her control), he or she may be 
reported in the SIS.60 
58 See Evelien Brouwer, Digital Borders and Real Rights. Effective remedies for third-country nationals in the Schengen 
Information System. Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 526-527 and JSA reports [..]
59 Joint Supervisory Authority, Article 96 Inspection Report of the Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority on 
an inspection of the use of Article 96 alerts in the Schengen Information System, Brussels 20 June 2005. 
See also Schengen Joint Supervisory Authority,8th Activity Report December 2005 – December 2008, p. 11.
60 Dutch Aliens circular 2000, para. A3/9.2.1 en 9.2.2. See the critical report of the Dutch National Ombuds-
man on the Dutch law and practice concerning the alerts on third-country nationals in SIS: Toegang 
verboden. Onderzoek naar de opname van vreemdelingen in het Schengen Informatie Systeem en de informatievoorziening 
daarover  Report no. 2010/115, June 2010.
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For the individual, to rebut the application of mutual recognition or, in 
other words, the enforcement of a SIS alert is problematic for at least two 
reasons. 
Firstly, this requires the person concerned to be informed of the exact 
reason for refusal of visa or entrance. The obligation in the Schengen 
Borders Code for national border guards to inform the person concerned of 
the reasons for refusing him or her entrance does not include information 
on the exact reasons for the (foreign) SIS alert. Also, as we have seen above, 
the scope and accessibility of legal remedies are dependent on the relevant 
national law.
Secondly, the fact that SIS alerts are based on the discretionary 
power of the reporting states causes a problem for the national courts or 
authorities assessing the lawfulness of both the issuing of the SIS alert, and 
its execution. For example, a SIS alert based on the suspicion of a serious 
criminal offence opens the door for very wide application. Where third-
country nationals may be declared inadmissible or “unwanted’ on the basis 
of confidential reports from internal security agencies resulting in an 
alert in the SIS, this information cannot be effectively scrutinised by the 
individual or by the courts. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) provides for common standards and 
procedures regarding the return of illegally staying third-country nationals 
on the territory of the European Union.61 The Directive aims at establishing 
a common set of legal safeguards on decisions related to the return of illegal 
third-country nationals. The Directive introduces two essential instruments 
in the context of return: the return decision and the entry ban.
A return decision is an administrative or judicial decision or act that states 
or declares the stay of a third-country national illegal and obliges him 
or her to return.62 Whereas, as we have seen above, the decision to issue a 
refusal of entry in the SIS is based on the voluntary or discretionary power 
of the national administration, Article 6 of the Returns Directive imposes 
an imperative obligation on the Member States to issue a return decision 
to every third-country national staying illegally on their territory.63 Illegal 
stay is defined as the presence on the territory of a Member State of a third-
country national who does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions 
of entry as set out in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code or other 
conditions for entry, stay or residence in that Member State.64
In many cases, a return decision will be accompanied by an entry ban. 
An entry ban based on the Returns Directive is always related to a return 
decision and therefore cannot be issued independently.
According to the Directive, an entry ban is an administrative or judicial 
decision or act, which prohibits the person concerned from entering into 
and staying on the territory of the Member States for a specified period.65 
Article 11 of the Returns Directive imposes an imperative obligation on the 
Member States to accompany the return decision by an entry ban, if:
• no period for voluntary return has been granted or;
61 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, OJ L 348/98, 24.12.2008. This Directive applies in the Member States 
of the EU, except for Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland. The Directive also applies in Norway, 
Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein.
62 Article 3(4) of the Returns Directive.
63 The Directive does not apply to persons enjoying the community right of free movement (Article 2(3) 
Directive). In addition Member States may according to Article 2(2) Directive decide not to apply this Di-
rective to third-country nationals who (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of 
the Schengen Borders Code, or who are apprehended or intercepted in connection with irregular crossing 
by land, sea or air and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay, or (b) are 
subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to 
national law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.
64 Article 3(2) of the Returns Directive.
65 Article 3(8) of the Directive.
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• the obligation to return has not been complied with.
In all other situations, Member States may accompany a return decision 
by an entry ban. Effectively this means that an entry ban can be issued to 
almost all third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of the 
Member States.
4.2 Justifications for mutual trust
The Returns Directive does not explicitly mention the principle of mutual 
trust. The Directive aims at providing an effective return policy as a 
necessary element of a well managed migration policy. This also includes 
preventing illegal third-country nationals from re-entering the EU illegally. 
Mutual trust in this context refers to the recognition of return measures 
taken by the authorities of other Member States. However, the Returns 
Directive does not provide for the exchange of information on national 
return decisions. It is the entry ban that gives the measures of return a 
European dimension.66 The entry ban applies in all Member States that 
are bound by the Directive. In all these states the third-country national 
concerned is to be banned for a specific period of time. For effective 
enforcement, information about issued entry bans is to be shared between 
the Member States. Otherwise, a person to whom an entry ban has been 
issued might (re-)enter the territory of the EU via another Member State 
and subsequently move freely within the territory of the EU. Information 
about issued entry bans is to be shared between the Member States by 
listing the person concerned in the aforementioned SIS. Remarkably, this 
reporting in the SIS is not explicitly provided for in the provisions of the 
Returns Directive, but in recital 18 of the Preamble. According to this 
recital, Member States should have rapid access to information on entry 
bans issued by other Member States by using the SIS. In other words, in 
the light of mutual recognition and execution of nationally issued entry 
bans, registration in the SIS is crucial. However, without an entry ban that 
accompanies a return decision no registration on the basis of this Directive 
can take place. Therefore, it is useful to consider the system of return 
measures provided by the Returns Directive separately.
66 Recital 14 of the Preamble. 
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4.3 Exceptions to mutual trust
a)	Exceptions	to	issuing	a	return	decision
Article 6(1) of the Returns Directive is formulated in an imperative way: 
Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national 
staying illegally on their territory. However, under certain circumstances a 
Member State may refrain from issuing a return decision.67 
Firstly, a Member State may decide not to issue a return decision to 
a third-country national who holds a valid residence permit or other 
authorisation to stay issued by another Member State. In that case, 
this third-country national is urged to go to that other Member State 
immediately. However, if he or she does not comply with this requirement 
or when his or her immediate departure is required for reasons of public 
policy or national security, a return decision may still be issued. Secondly, 
a Member State may decide not to issue a return decision to an illegally 
staying third-country national if he or she is taken back by another 
Member State under a bilateral agreement or arrangement. In that case 
the Member State that takes the third-country national back shall issue 
a return decision. Thirdly, a Member State may grant an autonomous 
residence permit or other authorisation to stay for compassionate, 
humanitarian or other – unspecified – reasons to a third-country national 
staying illegally on their territory. In that case, the Member State 
concerned refrains from issuing a return decision. If a return decision has 
already been issued, the Member State shall withdraw or suspend it for the 
duration of the legitimate stay.
Finally, a Member State shall consider refraining from issuing a return 
decision if the illegal third-country national is the subject of a pending 
procedure for renewing his or her residence permit or other authorisation 
offering a right to stay until the pending procedure has been completed.
A return decision normally provides for an appropriate period of between 
seven and thirty days for the third-country national to leave the Member 
State voluntarily.68 However, Member States may refrain from granting a 
period for voluntary departure or grant a period shorter than seven days 
if: a) there is a risk of absconding, b) the application for legal stay has been 
dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or c) the third-country 
national concerned poses a risk to public policy, public or national security. 
67 Article 6(2), (3), (4)and (5) of the Directive.
68 Article 7 of the Directive.
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If no period for voluntary return has been granted or if the period for 
voluntary departure is not complied with, Article 8 of the Directive obliges 
the Member States to take all necessary measures to physically remove the 
illegal third-country national from their territory.
b)	Exceptions	to	issuing	an	entry	ban
Article 11(1) of the entry ban is also formulated imperatively. According to 
this provision, a return decision shall be accompanied by an entry ban if 
no period for voluntary departure has been granted or if the obligation to 
return has not been complied with. In all other cases return decisions may 
be accompanied by an entry ban. However, Member States may decide not to 
issue an entry ban under a broad range of circumstances.69
Firstly, no entry ban will be issued to victims of trafficking in human 
beings, provided that the third-country national concerned does not 
represent a threat to public policy, public, or national security. Secondly, 
Member States shall consider withdrawing or suspending an entry ban if 
the third-country national concerned can demonstrate that he or she has 
left the territory of a Member State in full compliance with the return 
decision. Thirdly, Member States may in individual cases refrain from 
issuing, withdraw or suspend an entry ban for humanitarian reasons. 
Finally, Member States may withdraw or suspend an entry ban in 
individual cases for other reasons. Although the obligation to issue an entry 
ban is formulated in an imperative way, this last provision in particular 
gives the Member States broad competence to withdraw or suspend an 
issued entry ban at their own discretion. 
A Member State that considers issuing a residence permit or other 
authorisation offering a right to stay to a third-country national who is 
subject to an entry ban issued by another Member State, shall first consult 
the Member State that has issued the entry ban and shall take account of 
its interests.70 Under this procedure, a Member State does not need to accept 
unconditionally the consequences of an entry ban that has been issued 
by another Member State, but that Member State is not completely free to 
grant a residence permit either. That Member State has to take account of 
the interest of the other Member State involved. 
In general, Article 4 of the Returns Directive states that the Directive 
shall be without prejudice to more favourable provisions deriving from 
69 See Article 11(3) of the Directive.
70 Article 11(4) of the Directive.
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bilateral or multilateral agreements with one or more third countries, 
the Community acquis relating to immigration and asylum or national 
provisions. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Directive obliges Member States to 
take due account of the best interests of the child, family life and the state 
of health of the third-country national concerned and respect the principle 
of non-refoulement when implementing this Directive. Therefore, these 
considerations must be taken into account not only by the Member States 
when issuing return decisions and entry bans, but also when enforcing 
entry bans.
Member States have the competence to decide, with due regard to all 
relevant circumstances of the individual case, on the length of the entry 
bans issued, with a maximum of five years.71 An entry ban may however 
exceed the five-year maximum if the third-country national represents a 
serious threat to public policy or public or national security. As we have 
seen above, personal data entered in the SIS shall be kept only for the 
time required to meet the purposes for which they have been supplied 
and the need for continued storage of this personal data must be reviewed 
not later than three years after their entry.72 Thus, there seems to be an 
inconsistency between the length of the entry ban and the time limit of 
three years for review of a SIS alert. However, it seems fair to reason that 
also with regard to entry bans which have been issued and entered in 
the SIS on the basis of the Returns Directive, Member States are obliged 
to review every three years the necessity of these alerts. Possibly this 
inconsistency will be rectified during the intended review of the second 
generation of the SIS (SIS II).73
4.4 Relativity of mutual trust
Although in many cases mutual trust may have a positive effect on 
European migration law, routine application of this principle is undesirable. 
The principle of mutual trust ought to be considered a useful presumption 
that, in some cases, may not be justified, for example, because the 
presumption conflicts with fundamental rights, such as the rights of 
the child in Article 24 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the EU.74 
71 Article 11(2) of the Directive.
72 Articles 112 CISA and 29 Regulation 1987/2006.
73 Council document 16166/08, ADD 1, REV 1, 02.12.2008.
74 OJEC, C 364/1, Brussels 18.12.2000.
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Also secondary EU law, for example the Family Reunification Directive 
(2003/86), may in certain cases require deviation from the presumption of 
mutual trust. The relevant provisions in this context are similar to those 
mentioned with regard to the listing in the SIS. For a detailed analysis the 
reader is referred to section 3.3.
4.5 Procedural safeguards
Third-country nationals to whom a return decision, an entry ban or a 
decision on removal has been issued, shall be afforded the possibility to 
appeal against or seek review of this decision before a competent judicial or 
administrative authority or another impartial and independent competent 
body.75 This authority or body must have the power to review the decision 
concerned, including the possibility of temporarily suspending the 
enforcement of the decision. 
Article 18(1) of the Returns Directive includes an important derogation 
from the rights of third-country nationals. When an exceptionally 
large number of third-country nationals has to be returned, placing an 
unforeseen burden on the capacity of the detention facilities of a Member 
State or its administrative or judicial staff (an emergency situation), 
a Member State may temporarily deviate from parts of the minimum 
standards for judicial review and detention. If such a situation occurs, the 
Member State concerned has to inform the European Commission as soon as 
possible and should also inform the Commission as soon as the emergency 
situation has ceased to exist.
4.6 Rebuttal of mutual trust 
The presumption of mutual trust and mutual recognition of entry bans can 
be an effective principle to ban unwanted third-country nationals from the 
territory of the Member States. As mentioned above, however, this mutual 
trust needs to be put into perspective. General concerns for the protection 
of fundamental rights oppose a routine application of this presumption. 
The individual concerned must in concreto have the possibility to try to rebut 
this presumption of mutual trust. In this regard, two issues need to be 
addressed. 
75 Article 13 of the Directive.
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Firstly, it is unclear how the instruments of the return decision and the 
SIS are related. There are two possible approaches to this relationship. 
On the one hand, it is suggested that the two are practically the same 
thing. According to recital 18 of the Preamble of the Returns Directive, a 
third-country national against whom an entry ban has been issued will 
automatically be registered in the SIS. The effect of the two is the same, 
namely denying an unwanted third-country national access to the territory 
of the EU. This might suggest that an entry ban is in fact the same as a 
registration in the SIS.
On the other hand, however, the criteria for registration in the SIS and the 
criteria for issuing an entry ban differ. Furthermore, the terms applicable 
to the storage of personal data are different: an entry ban may be issued for 
five years while the registration in the SIS must be reviewed every three 
years.76 Moreover, neither the Returns Directive nor the CISA provides for 
the withdrawal or suspension of the SIS alert when the preceding entry ban 
is withdrawn or suspended. Neither does the applicable legislation provide 
that deletion of the SIS alert results in withdrawal of the entry ban. This 
might suggest that these instruments are to be considered separately.
This ambiguity has consequences for the possibilities for the individual to 
challenge an entry ban. In the first scenario, where the entry ban and the 
SIS alert are considered the same, challenging a SIS alert would also mean 
challenging the underlying entry ban and vice versa. As mentioned above, 
the current CISA and the SIS II Regulation provide for a right to bring an 
action to correct, delete or obtain information in connection with an alert 
before the competent court or authority of each contracting party.77 If the SIS 
alert is indeed effectively challenged before a court, it would make sense if 
the underlying entry ban were to be withdrawn as well. 
In the second scenario, where the SIS alert and the entry ban are to 
be considered two different decisions, the individual concerned needs 
to challenge both instruments separately in court before he or she can 
lawfully enter the EU. In this context, the question whether an entry 
ban can be challenged before a court in another Member State becomes 
prominent. The Returns Directive is, unlike the CISA, unclear on whether 
the right to appeal against or seek review of return measures also implies 
the possibility for national authorities to review, withdraw or suspend 
76  Articles 112 CISA and 29 Regulation 1987/2006.
77  Article 43 CISA and Article 111 SIS II-Regulation.
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return decisions and entry bans issued by other Member States. Article 13(1) 
of the Directive only affords the possibility to appeal against or seek review 
of a return decision, or, if issued an entry-ban or removal decision, before 
an independent competent judicial or other body.
From the perspective of the right to an effective remedy it would be 
undesirable if, in accordance with the second scenario, after the SIS alert 
has been lifted following a national court or competent authority’s decision, 
the applicant would still be required to address the state issuing the entry 
ban to ask for withdrawal of the entry ban. Therefore, the first scenario, 
according to which an entry ban may be challenged together with the SIS 
alert before the court or competent authority of any participating Member 
State, is to be favoured.
Secondly, the Returns Directive combines the obligation to issue a return 
decision or an entry ban with only a minimal level of harmonization. 
For one thing, the definition of irregular stay is – despite the provision 
on entry conditions included in Article 5 of the Schengen Borders Code 
– mainly a question of national law. In the Netherlands, for example, 
irregular stay may result from exceeding the duration of a visa, not 
correctly reporting departure at the aliens’ registration office, or 
deregistering at the municipal personal records database.78 Furthermore, 
Member States have wide discretion with regard to the issuing, 
withdrawing and suspending of entry bans. Although Article 11(1) of the 
Directive is formulated imperatively, the Member States are given broad 
opportunities to deviate from this obligation.
This results in differences between Member States’ practices regarding 
the process of return. If the appeal is aimed at an entry ban issued by 
another Member State, the question is to what extent the applicant can 
rebut the presumption of mutual recognition. With whom lies the burden of 
proof for rebutting this presumption? And when is the presumption of trust 
to be considered as rebutted? In abstracto the application of the principle 
of mutual trust as a presumption often positively contributes to European 
migration law. It is, therefore, initially up to the individual concerned to 
provide proof why in his or her case this presumption is not justified. If, 
however, the individual demonstrates that in his or her case mutual trust 
(or recognition) is not justified, the national courts or competent authorities 
must go into the scrutiny of the application of the Directive provisions by 
the Member State issuing the entry ban. These courts or authorities should 
78 See also section 3.6 above.
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then, even if national law on this point is only minimally harmonized, 
verify whether the issuing Member State should in this particular case have 
deviated from its obligation to issue an entry ban.
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5.1 Introduction
The developments towards closer cooperation in criminal matters in the EU 
are predominantly characterized by the introduction and implementation 
of the principle of mutual recognition. Being the leading principle, it 
obliges the Member States to accept judicial decisions handed down in 
another Member State and to attach to these foreign judicial decisions the 
same legal effects as similar national judicial decisions. Currently, the 
principle of mutual recognition applies to custodial sanctions, financial 
penalties, probation measures, alternative sanctions, confiscation orders, 
arrest warrants, certain evidence warrants, pre-trial supervision measures, 
and, finally, to the existence of previous convictions for the purpose of 
taking them into account in new criminal proceedings.79 The application of 
mutual recognition in the field of criminal law is based on the assumption 
of a high level of mutual trust between the Member States. This may seem 
quite obvious: which nation-state would be willing to grant legal assistance 
to a nation-state that enjoys a bad reputation in matters of criminal justice?
It is, however, not easy to interpret the notion of mutual trust in this area 
of law. In answering the question what mutual trust means two elements 
should be distinguished. The first element relates to the subject of mutual 
trust: trust in what? Divergent answers to this question have been given 
over time. The 2000 programme of measures to implement the mutual 
recognition principle – designed shortly after the introduction of the 
principle – mentions the presumption of ‘trust in each others’ criminal 
justice systems’,80 whereas the later multi-annual Hague Programme refers 
to mutual confidence as being based on ‘the certainty that all European 
citizens have access to a judicial system meeting high standards of quality’.81 
Other sources mention a more specific subject of mutual trust, such as the 
(integrity of) foreign judicial authorities82, or the accuracy of information 
79 For an overview of the various framework decisions and directives, including draft instruments, see J. 
Ouwerkerk, Quid Pro Quo? A comparative law perspective on the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal 
matters (diss. Tilburg), Intersentia 2011, pp. 82-90.
80 OJ 15.1.2001, C 12/10.
81 Council, ‘The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union’, OJ 
03.03.2005, C 53/11 (par. 3.2). 
82 See for instance the ULB study of 20 November 2008, ‘Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in cri-
minal matters in the European Union’, where p. 20 states: ‘…mutual confidence between Member States’ 
judicial and prosecuting authorities…’, further G. Stessens, ‘The Principle of Mutual Confidence between 
Judicial Authorities in the Area of Freedom, Justice and Security’, in: G. de Kerchove, and A. Weyembergh 
(eds.), L’espace penal européen: enjeux et perspectives, Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2001, pp. 
93-94. 
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provided by these foreign judicial authorities.83 It seems that the various 
subjects are interrelated: trust in the integrity of judicial authorities of a 
certain Member State, for instance, forms part of the general trust in the 
legal system of this Member State.84 Mutual trust in its broadest sense thus 
means reciprocal confidence in the criminal justice systems of the colleague 
Member States.85
The second element of mutual trust relates to the aforementioned difference 
between formal trust and trust in concreto. This element of trust strongly 
relates to the question of judicial review and the possibilities to rebut the 
justifiability of trust in practice. After all, pure formal trust implies a 
review ex ante, whereas trust in concreto needs to be assessed ex post, thereby 
leaving room to consider the particular circumstances of an individual 
case. These issues form the focus of this reflection and will be dealt with 
step by step below. 
5.2 Justifications for mutual trust
It is commonly recognized that the establishment of the EU as ‘an area 
without internal frontiers’ justifies the current approach to judicial 
cooperation in criminal affairs, which departs from the necessity to 
cooperate on the basis of mutual trust. In this area, the notion of mutual 
trust is predominantly interpreted as formal trust (or trust in abstracto). This 
applies all the more since, in 1999, mutual recognition was introduced as 
a leading principle in this area of EU competence. The 2000 programme of 
measures required that all Member States adhere to the principles of Article 
83 V.H. Glerum and N. Rozemond, ‘Overlevering en Uitlevering’, in: E. van Sliedregt, J.M. Sjöcrona and 
A.M.M. Orie (eds.), Handboek Internationaal Strafrecht, Deventer: Kluwer 2008, p. 158. 
84 Likewise M. Fichera, ‘Mutual Trust in European Criminal Law’, University of Edinburgh School of Law 
Working Paper Series 2009/10, p. 13: ‘…a judicial authority within a State will have to trust a foreign legal 
system and more specifically: a) the product of that legal system […] and, depending on the case, b) the 
capacity of either the issuing or the executing authority and all other competent authorities’. Stessens, 
however, expresses another view, mentioning a twofold confidence being required: firstly, confidence in 
the legal system of the issuing jurisdiction and, secondly, confidence between the issuing and executing 
judicial authorities, Stessens 2001, pp. 93-94.
85 From the perspective of the principle of mutual recognition, Maduro has explained this broad interpreta-
tion of mutual trust as follows: ‘The mutual recognition of judicial decisions (in the area of freedom, secu-
rity and justice, added by author) is not based simply on the mutual recognition of each applicable norm 
but on the assumption that the other’s judicial and legislative decisions are legitimate in systemic terms. 
It is the entire system which must be recognized as a system affording all the appropriate protections, 
notably in the area of fundamental rights’, M.P. Maduro, ‘So close and yet so far: the paradoxes of mutual 
recognition’, Journal of European Public Policy 14 (2007), p. 823.
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6(1) of the former EU Treaty,86 as a result of which the level of mutual trust 
was considered adequate to apply mutual recognition to judicial decisions in 
criminal matters throughout the European Union:
“That trust is grounded, in particular, on their shared commitment to 
the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for human rights, 
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.”87
This formulation can be considered an indirect reference to the fact that all 
EU Member States are parties to the ECHR; this convention was mentioned 
in Article 6(2) of the former EU Treaty and is even declared as constituting 
‘general principles of the Union’s law’ in Article 6(3) of the current EU 
Treaty. Within the framework of the European Arrest Warrant, Dutch case 
law has shown that in many cases, the issuing Member State’s membership 
of the ECHR is seized upon to refrain from an in-depth examination of the 
requested person’s defence that his or her rights have been violated by or 
will be violated in the issuing Member State.88 
5.3 Exceptions to mutual trust
That the Member States are in principle obliged to grant each other legal 
assistance and to recognize and enforce each others’ judicial decisions 
does not exclude that under certain conditions Member States may decide 
to refuse cooperation and recognition. Though mutual trust remains to 
be interpreted as formal trust in principle, it has in the meantime been 
recognized that the actual level of trust between the Member States is 
not as high as assumed. As a result, the several framework decisions 
and Directives that implement the principle of mutual recognition still 
include several grounds for refusing the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judicial decisions. These refusal grounds relate to the principle of 
ne bis in idem; national provisions of amnesty; immunity and privileges; 
national prescription provisions; the age of criminal responsibility; the 
86 Article 6(1) former EU Treaty states: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States’. Its equivalent in the current EU Treaty can be found in Article 2 which states: ‘The Union 
is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities’. 
87 OJ 15.1.2001, C 12/10.
88 J.W. Ouwerkerk, ‘Wederzijdse erkenning en wederzijds vertrouwen: de Nederlandse rechtspraak inzake 
overlevering’, in: R.S.T. Gaarthuis, T. Kooijmans en Th. A. de Roos, Vertrouwen in de strafrechtspleging, Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2010, pp. 87-102.
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(lack) of consent given by a suspected or sentenced person; the principle 
of territoriality; the insufficiency of information delivered by the issuing 
authorities; and the fact that the foreign decision was handed down in the 
absence of the person involved.89
These refusal grounds, however, may not give rise to a blunt refusal on 
the ground of general distrust of the issuing Member State’s criminal justice 
system, nor the inkling that fundamental rights have been violated, nor on 
general distrust of the integrity of the foreign judicial authorities and the 
accuracy of information provided. 
With most refusal grounds, the various Member States are free to decide 
whether a refusal on these grounds is obligatory or optional. However, 
with regard to the alleged insufficiency of information – for instance 
because information is lacking or incomplete – the various instruments 
prescribe postponement of the decision whether or not to recognize. In the 
meantime, the executing authorities can request (more) information from 
the issuing authorities. Should the issuing authorities remain in default in 
sending the required information, the issuing Member State is allowed to 
refuse recognition and enforcement of the judicial decision concerned.
Where there is an alleged violation of fundamental and human rights, 
the various instruments do not provide an express ground to refuse for 
this reason. It has been hotly debated whether such an explicit refusal 
ground would be desirable. Although it is true that the obligations resulting 
from the Member States’ adherence to human rights treaties do apply 
(irrespective of whether a Council framework decision or Council directive 
provides for a refusal ground based on violation of these obligations), 
and that the various instruments do state in their preambles that their 
application must not lead to violations of fundamental and human rights, 
an explicit refusal ground would create more clarity with regard to the 
nature and scope of the obligations resulting from international and 
European instruments. 
In the context of extradition (or surrender), the ECtHR has appeared to 
attach consequences to the fact that the state concerned is a party to the 
ECHR. It follows from consistent Strasbourg case law that a state can be 
held liable, on the basis of Articles 1, 3, and 6 ECHR, for breaches of the 
ECHR in another, second state, if these breaches are the consequence of a 
89 For an overview of refusal grounds provided for in the several framework decisions and directives, see 
Ouwerkerk 2011, pp. 102-110.
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decision taken by the first state to extradite a person to this second state.90 
However, when this second state is a party to the ECHR – this applies to 
all EU Member States – the liability of the issuing state will be reviewed 
more leniently by the ECtHR, because the extradited person is then able 
to lodge a complaint with Strasbourg.91 Yet in a 2010 case, the ECtHR 
declared inadmissible a complaint that surrender would violate Article 
6 ECHR, because there were no facts supporting a ‘flagrant denial’ of the 
right to fair trial. And, the Court reiterated that at the end of the national 
criminal procedure in the issuing Member State, the extradited person 
could lodge a complaint with Strasbourg.92 These decisions give rise to a 
formal interpretation of the notion of mutual trust in the field of judicial 
cooperation in the European Union. 
In practice, such a formal interpretation of mutual trust is applied at 
the national level, for instance in the Netherlands. Although Dutch 
implementation legislation does provide for an explicit ground to refuse 
recognition of a European arrest warrant if surrender would lead to a 
flagrant denial of fundamental rights as laid down in the ECHR, it is 
consistent case law in the Netherlands that this refusal ground may only be 
invoked if the individual circumstances of the requested person so requires: 
general knowledge with regard to prison regimes, police interrogations, 
treatment of suspects, et cetera in the issuing Member State concerned has 
appeared to be insufficient to result in a refusal to surrender.93
5.4 Relativity of mutual trust
As previously mentioned, though mutual trust tends to be interpreted 
in a formal manner, mainly under limited circumstances, the executing 
Member State is allowed to refuse the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judicial decisions. After all, mutual recognition cannot be absolute 
and mutual trust cannot be blind trust. There are three issues that 
illustrate quite well the relativity of mutual trust in the context of judicial 
cooperation in criminal affairs in the European Union (a-c). 
90 ECtHR 7 July 1989, appl. no. 14038/88 (Soering v. United Kingdom). According to e.g. Fichera, the references 
to fundamental rights and legal principles in the preamble of the Framework Decision on the European 
arrest warrant should be interpreted as a reference to the Soering-paradigm, see M. Fichera, ‘The European 
Arrest Warrant and the Sovereign State: A Marriage of Convenience?’, European Law Journal 15 (2009), p. 81.   
91 ECtHR 4 October 2007, appl. no. 12049/06 (Lefter Cenaj v. Greece and Albany).  
92 ECtHR 4 May 2010, appl. no. 56588/07 (Stapleton v. Ireland). 
93 Ouwerkerk 2010, again confirmed by recent case law of the Amsterdam district court, for instance: Rb. 
Amsterdam 8 februari 2011, LJN BP5567.
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a)	Relativity	of	trust	in	the	compliance	with	fundamental	and	human	
rights	norms
It is common knowledge that being a party to the ECHR does not guarantee 
100% compliance with the obligations resulting from this convention. As 
appears from ECtHR decisions, many breaches of human rights do occur on 
the territories of its joining parties, not least on the territories of the EU 
Member States. But even if membership of the ECHR would guarantee that 
human rights are taken very seriously; even if national legislation would 
fully correspond with the minimum level required; and even if in most 
cases these human rights appear to be guaranteed indeed, it may always 
occur that in an individual case the norms of the ECHR are violated. For 
that reason alone, it should always remain undesirable to cooperate on a 
basis of pure formal trust. Such an ‘obligation to trust’ would completely 
paralyze the judicial authorities of the Member States in those situations 
where it is crystal clear that the incoming request for cooperation has to 
be declined, for instance in cases of mistaken identity, or in cases of severe 
breaches of human rights. 
b)	Mutual	trust	as	a	decisive	factor	in	applying	refusal	grounds?	
In 2002, the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant was 
adopted. Being the first mutual recognition instrument, one of its main 
characteristics compared to traditional extradition instruments was the 
limited number of refusal grounds compared to traditional extradition 
instruments. This characteristic was justified by the assumed high level 
of mutual trust between the 27 Member States. Because of this high level 
of trust, the existence of intermediate checks – e.g. whether the arrest 
warrant had been issued for a political or press offence, or for an act also 
punishable in the executing Member State, or whether the arrest warrant 
had been issued against a person who was a national of the executing 
Member State – was considered less necessary than in the relationships 
with non-EU Member States. Amongst politicians, legal practitioners, and 
academics, the reduction of refusal grounds was looked at suspiciously; 
after all, such limited grounds on which to decline surrender would lead 
to an increased number of undesirable transfers from persons to other 
Member States. 
After the adoption of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest 
Warrant, the number of refusal grounds remained a hot topic during 
negotiations for other framework decisions and directives on the application 
of the mutual recognition principle (e.g. with regard to financial penalties, 
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custodial sanctions, evidence warrants, et cetera). In most cases, an extended 
number of refusal grounds than initially proposed became the main issue, 
either departing from the preservation of national sovereignty or from the 
unjustified assumption of mutual trust, or from the notion of protection of 
the individual. 
Though these positions are understandable and relevant, it must be 
emphasized that refusal grounds may have opposing consequences in 
different situations and under varying mutual recognition instruments. 
For instance, if Member State A declines to surrender a person to Member 
State B on the ground that earlier ill-treatment of this person in Member 
State B has been established, the requested person will remain in Member 
State A. But, when Member State A refuses, for the same reason of earlier 
ill-treatment, to recognize and enforce a custodial sentence imposed 
by Member State B, the consequence may be that the sentenced person 
remains in custody in the very Member State B where he was ill-treated. 
The question arises whether in the latter situation other factors (e.g. 
humanitarian reasons) could be decisive, rather than justifiable trust only.
	c)	Relativity	of	trust	from	the	perspective	of	proportionality
A too absolute interpretation of mutual recognition and mutual trust may 
backfire on cooperation in practice. This can be further illustrated by the 
ongoing discussion on proportionality in the context of surrender; this 
discussion touches on the margins of examination left to the Member 
States involved in surrender cases and the justifiability of trust. In a recent 
evaluation of the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant, 
the Commission directed particular attention to the systematic issue of 
European arrest warrants in relation to very minor offences. Although 
these offences do fall within the scope of the Framework Decision, they are 
commonly regarded as not serious enough to start surrender proceedings. 
The Commission observed that this systematic issuing of European arrest 
warrants for such minor offences has undermined confidence in the 
application of the European arrest warrant.94 The Commission – supported 
by a significant number of Member States – has proposed the introduction 
of a proportionality check, by means of which several aspects should be 
considered before a European arrest warrant is issued (e.g. the seriousness 
of the offence and the length of the sentence). If the Commission’s proposal 
94  Report from the Commission on the implementation, since 2007, of the Council Framework decision of 13 
June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States, Brus-
sels, COM(2011) 175 final, p. 7.  
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is followed, the additional proportionality check will fall under the 
responsibility of the issuing Member State: it remains unclear whether 
the executing Member State would be allowed to refuse surrender on the 
ground that a proportionality check had not been applied, or had wrongly 
been applied (which would be quite difficult to assess). Though it remains 
to be seen where this discussion will lead, it shows the relativity of mutual 
trust in individual cases: a too rigid allocation of responsibilities to the 
issuing Member State is likely to reduce the actual level of trust between 
the Member States and possibly also, in turn, the degree of mutual trust in 
abstracto. 
5.5 Procedural safeguards
The various instruments on mutual recognition do not provide a consistent 
approach to the issue of legal remedies for persons subject to a mutual 
recognition measure. Only some of the instruments require the possibility 
of legal remedies for any interested party, thus suspects are included. The 
suspect in whose case a freezing order or a confiscation order is transmitted 
to the executing Member State must be ensured to have legal remedies 
against recognition and execution of such an order in the executing Member 
State.95 However, such a challenge may not concern the substantive reasons 
for issuing the confiscation order, as such a challenge shall be brought 
before a court in the issuing Member State.96
Within the framework of cross-border evidence gathering, effective 
remedies for the suspect must be ensured, at least against the use of 
coercive measures in order to obtain evidence. The exercise of this right 
should be facilitated, especially by providing the suspect with relevant 
and adequate information.97 Should the individual, however, challenge the 
substantive reasons for issuing the European evidence warrant, he or she 
has to bring an action before the courts of the issuing Member State.98 
Also, the follow-up to the Framework Decision on the European Evidence 
Warrant, referred to as the Draft Directive on the European Investigation 
Order in criminal matters, mentions the requirement for legal remedies. 
The most recent version of this proposal obliges the Member States to 
ensure that any interested party can invoke the same legal remedies 
as those available in a domestic case against the investigative measure 
95 Article 11 FO respectively Article 9 CO.
96 Article 11(2) FO respectively Article 9(2) CO.
97 Article 18 EEW.
98 Article 18(2) EEW.
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concerned.99 However, it remains that substantive reasons for issuing the 
European Investigation Order are to be challenged in the issuing Member 
State.100 In addition to the aforementioned legal remedies, Article 111 CISA 
and Article 59 of the SIS II Decision101 provide the right to bring an action 
to correct, delete, or obtain information on an alert involving him or her. 
Such an action has to be brought before the competent court or authority 
in the territory of each contracting party. The other mutual recognition 
instruments are silent on this topic. As a result, it varies from Member 
State to Member State if and which legal remedies can be invoked.102 
5.6 Rebuttal of mutual trust
The existing mutual recognition regime in the area of criminal law 
allocates primary responsibility to the issuing Member State. Departing 
from a sufficient level of trust in abstracto, the executing Member State 
has little room to examine the merits of an individual case. To rebut the 
application of mutual recognition and the justifiability of mutual trust 
in concreto appears to be very difficult, both for the executing authorities 
and the individual affected by a mutual recognition measure. This is 
particularly the case with alleged violations of fundamental rights. 
As mentioned under para. 5.3., it is not sufficient to deliver general 
information and documents concerning the status quo in the issuing 
Member State with a view to demonstrating that trust would be unjustified 
and that, in turn, mutual recognition would violate fundamental rights. 
Rather, the person involved is required to demonstrate that he or she as 
an individual is very likely to become the victim of such a violation of 
fundamental rights.
However, is there a glimmer of hope for the future? Recently, as we 
have seen above, within the framework of asylum law, the ECtHR decided 
in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece that the assumption of trust can be 
rebutted on the basis of general information only (such as documentation 
on prison regimes or asylum procedures), without the necessity for M.S.S 
to prove the likelihood that he himself would become a victim of this 
99 See Article 13 of Council document 11735/11 of 17 June 2011.
100 Article 13(3) of Council document 11735/11 of 17 June 2011.
101 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ 7.8.2007, L 205/63.
102 ULB study of 20 November 2008, ‘Analysis of the future of mutual recognition in criminal matters in the 
European Union’, p. 16.
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treatment.103 With this decision, the ECtHR broke new ground: after 
all, earlier case-law followed the line of reasoning currently still being 
followed within the context of extradition proceedings between EU Member 
States. It remains to be seen which course will be steered in the field of 
judicial cooperation in criminal affairs.104 Until then, the decision in M.S.S. 
might serve as a signal to Brussels and the Member States that there are 
substantive reasons for reassessing the prevailing interpretations of mutual 
trust.
103  ECtHR 21 January 2011, appl. no. 30696/09.
104  See also (available in Dutch only): M.A.K. Klaassen, ‘De toepassing van het interstatelijk vertrouwensbe-
ginsel na M.S.S./België en Griekenland’, Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Europees Recht 4 (2011), pp. 118-121. 
49
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6.1 Introduction
The Meijers Committee supports the implementation of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition between EU Member States as underlying principles 
for cooperation within the fields of asylum, migration and criminal law. 
However, the previous sections in which examples of mutual trust and 
mutual recognition in different fields of European law have been discussed, 
establish some considerable gaps between the protection of fundamental 
rights of individuals and legal remedies. These gaps become particularly 
visible with regard to the possibility of individuals and courts to rebut the 
‘presumption’ of mutual trust. Instead of further developing the ‘automatic’ 
application or presumption of mutual trust within the EU and considering 
it an alternative for further harmonization of national laws, more attention 
should be paid to the balance between mutual trust and the protection 
of fundamental rights. In this regard, the Meijers Committee considers 
the adoption and implementation of extra safeguards and procedural 
guarantees necessary. These safeguards or guarantees should provide 
national competent authorities with further tools for solving questions 
relating to the burden of proof and the rebuttal of the presumption of 
mutual trust. 
6.2 Three stages
With regard to these conditions, the Meijers Committee differentiates 
between three stages at which these safeguards or conditions apply. The 
first stage (European rules on trust) concerns safeguards or conditions which 
have to be realised or established by both the European and the national 
legislator as a general and permanent prerequisite for the application of 
mutual trust or mutual recognition. At a second stage (Decision-making), we 
refer to conditions that have to be respected by the competent executing 
authority in the issuing or responsible state (that is, the state that should be 
trusted by the executing state: with regard to the SIS, the Returns Directive 
and judicial decisions in criminal matters (e.g. the EAW), the responsible 
state is the state issuing the SIS alert or entry ban, respectively the judicial 
decision; in Dublin cases it is the state whose responsibility for the asylum 
seeker has been established). Furthermore, the conditions to be met at the 
stage of decision-making concern the obligations of the executing state (for 
EAW, SIS, Returns Directive) or the transferring state (Dublin). The third 
stage (Rebutting trust) concerns the possibility for the individual to rebut 
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mutual trust or mutual recognition and the powers of national courts to 
assess this rebuttal.
The Meijers Committee points to the fact that there is possibly reciprocity 
between the conditions or safeguards applying in these stages and that they 
may operate as communicating vessels. In other words, if at one stage more 
stringent criteria or conditions have been implemented in relation to the 
principle of mutual trust (for example, extended harmonization of national 
criteria), the conditions or safeguards for implementation at the other stage 
may be formulated or applied less strictly.  
6.2.1	 European	rules	on	trust
General prerequisites for legislation and implementation of mutual trust 
instruments by the European and the national legislator:
• Minimum harmonization of law: with regard to the SIS and judicial 
decisions in criminal matters this means (more precise) definitions 
of crimes, offences and facts for which a SIS alert or entry ban or a 
EAW may be issued. With regard to Dublin this presupposes (extended) 
harmonization of the criteria as regards material (Qualification Directive) 
and procedural asylum law (Procedures and Reception Directive). In 
relation to criminal matters, this means further continuing the path 
currently followed on the basis of the roadmap for strengthening 
procedural rights of suspected or accused persons in criminal 
proceedings,105 since the EU is the perfect platform on which to develop 
a minimum level of procedural rights that would surpass the minimum 
level required on the basis of the ECHR. The harmonization of procedural 
rights in the context of criminal proceedings will contribute to the 
justifiability of mutual trust between the Member States.
• Clear formulation of (mandatory) exceptions. This means that for each 
field of competence (asylum, migration, or criminal law) a coherent set 
of exceptions should be created. Furthermore, codification of a human 
rights exception is recommended in order to clarify the nature and 
scope of the obligations that follow from existing international and 
European provisions aimed at the protection of human rights. Such 
a human rights exception should include more than just a general 
reference to these obligations. Rather, it should enable the competent 
105  Resolution of the Council of 30 November 2009, OJ 4.12.2009, C 295/1.
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authorities to distinguish between structural and individual violations 
of human rights in the issuing or responsible Member State. In the case 
of structural problems, it should be sufficient to use common knowledge 
and documentation concerning the Member State involved as a basis 
for refusal, whereas in the case of individual problems, it would be 
reasonable to demand a heavier burden of proof from the individual 
concerned compared to cases where structural problems arise. In 
accordance with relevant case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights, application of the exception should be mandatory in cases of 
violations of Articles 2 or 3 ECHR, whereas it should be limited to only 
flagrant violations of provisions such as Articles 6 or 8 ECHR.
• Clear formulation of procedural rights and legal remedies for the 
individual concerned which enables him or her to challenge a decision 
before it is executed or carries legal effects. This could be accomplished by 
extending the existing provision which is now provided with regard to 
the use of SIS (Article 111 CISA, Article 43 SIS II Regulation, and Article 59 
SIS II Decision) to other fields of law, and according to which individuals 
may start procedures before the competent court or authority in the 
territory of each Member State. 
• Optimization of the existing possibilities to monitor national 
implementation schemes by the European Commission, in particular 
with an eye on the level of protection required by international and 
European standards. Here, NGOs and international organisations could 
play an important role. It should be examined whether these review 
and evaluation procedures could be connected to official reports on the 
protection of human rights in the various Member States (e.g. reports on 
detention regimes). Moreover, it is strongly recommended to ensure that 
there is full implementation in the national legislation of the respective 
Member States before starting negotiations on amendments and new 
instruments.
6.2.2	 Decision-making
Decision-making by the issuing or responsible state
Conditions to be respected by the issuing (SIS/judicial decisions in criminal 
matters) or responsible (Dublin) state:
• The decision should be in conformity with (further harmonized) criteria 
of the instrument concerned.
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• The decision should respect the rights of the person concerned (EU 
citizenship, non- refoulement, family reunification, procedural rights).
• The issuing or responsible state should assess the necessity and adequacy 
of a measure to be ‘mutually enforced’ by other Member States, taking 
into account the EU principle of proportionality.
• The right to information should apply, including informed decision-
making, meaning that the issuing or responsible state should be required 
to inform an individual as soon as the decision has been adopted or the 
alert has been issued. This information should include the reasons for the 
decision or alert, the consequences of mutual trust, and the possibilities 
to judicially remedy this decision or alert.
• The individual concerned should have access to effective legal remedies to 
try to rebut the issuing decision or the decision on which a state should be 
responsible.
6.2.2.2	Decision-making	by	the	executing	or	transferring	state
Conditions to be met by the executing state (SIS/judicial decisions in 
criminal matters) or transferring state (Dublin):
• The executing or transferring decision should respect the rights of the 
person concerned (EU citizenship, non-refoulement, family reunification, 
procedural rights).
• The principle of proportionality should be complied with.
• The right to information should apply, implying informed decision-
making both on the grounds and the legal basis of the measure or 
decision concerned and on the available legal remedies.
• The individual concerned should have access to effective legal remedies to 
try to rebut the executing or transferring decision.
• Legal remedies should have suspensive effect if the individual invokes 
violation of Article 2 and/or 3 ECHR and if the execution of the refuted 
measure or decision includes the risk of irreparable harm. 
6.2.3	 Rebutting	trust
Discretionary power of the judiciary of the Member States to consider the 
principle of mutual trust rebutted:
• Mutual trust as a presumption should remain the starting point.
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• The individual concerned should have the possibility to argue before the 
competent court or other competent body that in his or her individual 
case, the presumption of trust is not justified.
• If there is a general (or structural) concern that the conditions 
which have to be respected by the issuing, responsible, executing, or 
transferring state have not been met (e.g. reports by NGOs, as in the 
case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, or a significant number of negative 
decisions by the ECtHR or the CJEU or the national courts of the Member 
States), the burden of proof for the individual concerned should be 
lighter, compared to cases where there is occasional concern; in this latter 
case, the individual concerned should be required to provide proof to 
substantiate his or her claim that the presumption of trust is unjustified).
• If the conditions at the aforementioned stages have not been sufficiently 
met, the judicial authority should have the competence to regard the 
presumption of mutual trust as rebutted. This means that the court 
should be given the competence to annul the decision to issue or execute 
a SIS alert or entry ban, to transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible 
state, or to execute a judicial decision to provide information or evidence, 
or transfer the person concerned to another Member State.
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